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1.   Introduction: 
This paper reveals the positive view of Hume’s idea of necessary connection. Hume 
is the last philosopher of empiricist triumvirate. If anybody understands Hume’s 
Philosophy he can have ability to understand other philosophers as he explain his 
ideas in different ways in different context. Silbi-begie an important editor of Hume’s 
works states that “HUME’s philosophic writings are to be read with great caution. 
His pages, especially those of the Treatise, are full of matters, he says so many 
different things in so many different ways and different connections…it is very hard 
to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine” (E: 
vii). Prichard explains that sometimes his way of expression make the readers angry 
as the ideas are in complexity. He says that  ‘to my mind the Treatise is one of the 
most tedious of books, and close examination of it renders me not sceptical but 
angry. Of course, there is great deal of cleverness in it, but the cleverness is only 
that of extreme ingenuity or perversity, and the ingenuity is only exceeds by the 
perversity (Prichard: 174). 
In the history of western philosophy, we consider Kant, Hegel and Spinoza are the 
philosophers who introduce abstruse philosophy. But for Vinding Kruse and 
Passmore Hume is more complex than others. For John Passmore ‘Hume is one of 
the most exasperating of philosophers. Each separate sentence in his writings –with 
very few exceptions- is admirable in its lucidity: the tangled syntax and barbarous 
locutions, which bedevil the reader of Kant and Hegel are completely absent 
(Passmore:01). Vinding Kruse is a Danish scholar who states that ‘Hume was a far 
more complex, versatile, and ambitious character than, for instance, Kant or 
Spinoza. He combined two glaring contrasts: he was not only, like theses, a great 
solitary thinker, knowing but one purpose, the realization of truth; he was, indeed, a 
man with many irons in the fire, a man with divers aims” (Quoted by Mossner in 
Chappell:09). I merely present these quotes in order to introduce that Hume’s 
philosophy can be understood with caution and view of scrutinity.  
It is evitable to clear the meaning of causation and related terms for better 
comprehension as it confuses us. Considering the length of the paper it is described 
in nutshell view. Causalism or causal determinism is a doctrine and it holds that 
there is universal validity of causal principle. It asserts that there is nothing without 
cause. The other one is causal principle or causal law, which constructs law of 
causation. It holds that the same cause produce the same effects. The other 




fundamental element is the term causation which focuses on causal nexus (Bunge, 
M:1962:4). This is the necessary connection from which other all ideas come out. 
Philosophers and scientists have disputed on this through the ages. Hume as well 
focused on the idea of causation and even it is being discussed. Hume attempted to 
discuss this based on experience and scientific nature. 
As we have seen Hume’s intentions are twofold in forming his philosophical 
sketches. One is that he has strong belief on science and its method so that he 
expects that all other subjects including moral sciences should have scientific base. 
According to him there is no such certainty in moral sciences. We cannot have the 
clear idea and the idea never remains the same. For Hume the chief obstacle to the 
improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences, is the obscurity of the ideas, 
ambiguity of the terms” (E: 62)**. He agrees that there is a difference between 
natural science and moral science. We can perceive, without ambiguity, the same 
ideas and objects in the same way without any change. This is possible only in 
natural sciences. The terms and things are clear and determinate. Even the 
smallest distinction can be perceptible without variation. For instance we never 
confuse circle with oval or hyperbola. In some sciences like geometry we 
understand things by their definition or else we understand and comprehend by 
presenting the object to the senses. The second is refuting rationalist view that 
knowledge is inherent human and he has knowledge when he is born. In addition, 
his method is based on induction. Based on the condition and influence he attempts 
to form the idea of necessary connection. 
2.  Fundamental of his philosophical elements 
Those who read Hume understand that he denies causation the cause is not the 
precedent of the effect and believes he denies that there is connection between the 
cause and effect. This what I try to deny he never rejects. His causal analysis is not 
about logical subtleties. The ordinary employment of the tern necessary connection 
is what? One event X causes the other event Y, we see these X and Y are 
constantly conjoined. Then we teach ourselves X is necessary connection to the 
event Y. Whenever we see Y, without any empirical consideration we assume that 
there is X as Y is considered as effect. We understand there is a logical tie between 
the two. I argue that Hume rejects our unreasonable expectation but he did not say 
the tie is impossible. It will be possible some other way. He says according to this is 
superfluous expectation, we make mistake. He explained this in his Abstract (A: 
652) by exemplifying the strike of billiard ball. By all these, Hume accepts necessary 
connection not as logical tie, but an empirical evidence. To understand this concept 
we have to understand his theory of idea as he does not entertain metaphysical 
views of language. According to Hume terms should be considered as empirical. He 
emphasizes to understand what is ‘idea’ of certain word. 
According to Hume nothing is possible without impression. He argues that if we 
really want to talk about necessary connection, ‘we must find some impression’. 
When we talk about a relation of cause and effect, what actually happens in the 




phenomenon and what happens in the thinking? In order to explain this and to 
comprehend this principle, we have to reveal two realms. One: We observe 
numerous instances as pairs of events, in which one come after another. Our mind 
immediately comprehend the as cause and effect. If one event precedes the other 
we call, in spatiotemporally, the first as cause and the others effect. Hume’s 
strongest position is that we are unable to go further to our senses or we cannot find 
the third invisible idea from one or two instances. How do we come to know the 
idea? We see numerous sufficient instances where I can find such objects of being 
in the relations of contiguity and succession. We can find only the repetition comes 
in the instances and we can find now new idea. He argues that he is able to find 
that the every particular instance is not the same. But he is able to find that this 
collection of perception produces ‘a new impression’, the idea of necessary 
connection. That is to say that by this habit ‘the mind is determined by custom to 
consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its 
relation to the first object. ‘Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords 
mew the idea of necessity (T: 15)***. Here we are unable to understand properly or 
we understand wrongly something due to the obscurity of the ideas and ambiguity of 
terms. Because Hume believes  ‘disputes are multiplied, as if everything was 
uncertain; and these disputes are managed are managed with the greatest warmth, 
as if everything was certain’ (T:xvi). Hence he attempted to find elements in ideas, 
which is certain. 
Hume’s intention, as we hold, was to refute Cartesians’ innate ideas from which 
they posulate the idea of necessary connection. Idea of necessary connection is 
one, of which philosopher disputes and confronted. Most of them, according to 
Hume, misinterpreted it and mislead us. He denies the philosophers in the way they 
interpret. These philosophers, mainly Cartesians held the view of entailment theory, 
which called the view that there is a logical tie between cause and effect. The tie is 
permanent and it is the necessary connection with the cause. It seems like a logical 
connection in syllogistic mode. If men are mortal then if A is a man he is mortal. 
Therefore this kind of explanation is arbitrary and misleading. Necessary connection 
does not ever exist logical tie. He denies this type of connection. He holds the view 
that we reason beyond our immediate impression, and conclude that such particular 
causes must have such particular effects. (T:155) He believes only the sense 
perception. Though he denies this connection and relies only on sense perception, 
he affirms that “ we must find some impression, that gives rise to this idea of 
necessity” (T155) we can see how he interprets it. 
As we know, he puts forward three elements in connection with causation. Hume 
believes that there is no single quality (which universally belongs to all beings) to 
designate them as cause and effect, he concludes that idea of causation must be 
derived from some relation among objects. (T :75) These relations are contiguity, 
priority in time and necessary connections. According to Hume an object may be 
contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as cause.  There is a 
NECESSARY CONNECTION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of 




much greater importance, than any of the other two above mentioned. (E 77) Hence 
he is relating that necessary connections is more important that other two for the 
exact interpretation of causation. Even there is some textual evidences, we can 
understand his idea by understanding his whole philosophy. As Bauchamp 
mentions (Bauchamp:5) by taking nontextual considerations we can reduce the 
tensions of the disputes. 
Hume attempted to alternative instead of logical tie between cause and effect as he 
is very confidently holds the view that the idea of necessary connection is not ever-
existing logical tie.  Therefore we can conclude that he accepts that we have a belief 
that there is a connection between the cause and the correspondent effect. How 
does it happen? This happens in spacio-temporal basis. In these circumstances, he 
attempts to find ‘what is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are 
necessarily connected together’ (T: 155). Hume additionally gives emphasis on 
internal senses, which, as he considers, can have freedom to think without any 
bound. With these senses and the complex ideas, he intends to find the ‘power’. He 
argues that we can have chances to think about the ‘power and efficacy’ by complex 
ideas, by which we can find some ‘hints’. When we analyse within the mind about 
these ideas, we find impressions with great certainty from which it may be possibly 
be derived. 
At the outset of his Treatis and even in his Abstract, Hume expresses his antipathy 
on abstruse philosophers, and in the matter of necessary connection, he expresses 
the same. For Hume, the terms efficacy, power, force, energy, necessity, 
connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonyms (T: 157). If we define 
one of them, it will be applicable to the rest. According to Hume, philosophers, 
previously, have defined the terms like efficacy and power without finding their 
respective impressions. Especially Locke, as Coventry states, (Coventry.A: 90) 
causal power make us to think the connection. This is impossible according to 
Hume’s idea of impressions.  If these terms are complex the meaning should be 
derived form complex impressions and if they are simple, they should be derived 
from simple impressions. But we are unable to show any impressions of these 
ideas. For Hume, having the idea of logical tie is meaningless or misconception 
unless we find any kind of impression. 
Hume gives this in a simple positive way. ‘Suppose two objects to be presented to 
us, of which the one is cause and the other the effect’. We never see the tie, from 
this single instance, by which they are united. So ‘we should never be able to form 
any such ideas’. But again; suppose we observe several instances, in which the 
same objects are always conjoin’d together, we immediately conceive a connexion 
betwixt them and begin to draw an inference from one to another’ (T: 162-163). 
Form these several instances Hume attempts to find the power. He asserts that this 
multiplicity of resembling instances.  Constitutes the very essence of power or 
connection, and is the source from which the idea of it arises’ (T: 163). But we want 
to know the very essence of power from multiplicity. Suffice the first principle- the 




copy thesis- this idea is not a new original idea, like in the copy principle. ‘The 
repetition of perfectly similar instances can never alone give rise to an original idea’. 
But he holds the strong view that this repetition either discovers or produces 
something new. This new essence is the source of the idea of necessary 
connection.  
Hume explains how these events make us to think about the efficacy or necessary 
connection. He gives a flow of steps how ‘we perceive this idea’. In the first instance 
he postulates that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, 
can never give us any idea of power, or connexion between them. It arises only 
from the repetition of union. But this repetition neither discovers nor produces 
anything new in the objects. Despite we assert that there nothing is discovered, 
something happens.  This repetition has influenced the mind, by that customary 
transition it produces. He concludes that this customary transition is the same with 
the power and necessity. This power we derive from the customary transition is not 
the matter of objects, but of mind, that is ‘quality of perceptions, not of objects’. 
These perceptions are internally felt by the soul. Human being has the habit of 
astonishing things. Astonishment changes our mind to accept or refute a certain 
thing. In the act of getting the idea of necessary connection it does work.   
For Hume mental propensity is a foremost element in the act of forming idea in the 
soul. He argues that ‘the mind haws a great propensity to spend itself an external 
objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impression’ (T: 167). Whenever the 
similar act is performed, this propensity functions in the senses. It discovers the idea 
in the objects by collecting the qualities of the object. Suppose, we sometimes, state 
that these things are there exist before inventing because of respective (co-exiting) 
smell and sound are exist. We do, because we have already conjoined with them 
with some ‘visible objects. We, in this regard, naturally imagine a conjunction 
between the objects and the qualities even though there is no such a conjunction, 
and really exist nowhere’. But we, naturally, take the propensity as a sufficient 
reason for such apprehension because of the similarity in qualities and contiguity in 
place and time. We, here, suppose the necessity and power to lie in the objects, not 
as in the mind. Whenever we find this conjunction, our mind carries the idea from 
the apprehension to the object. 
We see many instances as singular ones and sometimes-complex ones. We 
observe, among the objects, one object follow the other. We never conclude that 
one is the cause and the other which follows the first, is the effect form the single 
instance. If it is a permanent tie, it should be, we could be able to understand it in 
the first instance. Hume exemplifies that ‘the impulse of one billiard-ball is attended 
with the motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. 
The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects 
(E:63). Based on this example, he concludes that singular instances do not make us 
to comprehend idea of power or necessary connection. From the first appearance, 
we never predict the effect. If the power is discoverable in could foresee the effect. 




The nature is not like this. We cannot foresee anything like necessary connection by 
a mere dint of thought and reasoning. 
Hume intends to find the alternative way to find the ‘internal structure’ of the mind, 
which supposed to produce new idea. He attempts by his definition of cause. 
Because, we have fault in finding this since we use mere inference, which seems to 
be in ‘preposterous manner’. By giving exact definition, we can correct the error and 
find the new idea of what it is. As we know, he presents two definitions. He replaces 
the second definition in order to fill the gab in the first definition. For Hume, the first 
definition is based on external objects and drawn ‘from objects foreign to the cause’. 
Hence he definitely expects that this definition is defective since it covers only the 
external phenomenon and appearance. Hence, he substitutes the other. It is 
actually, for Hume, suitable to understand the idea of necessary connection since it 
relates the mental realm. We observe objects seem as pairs several times as in the 
same relation in order of contiguity and succession. We find ‘constant conjunction’ 
as a common element in the process of observation. This is not a matter of mere 
reasoning but a mean of custom, ‘which determines the imagination to make a 
transition from the idea of one object to that of its usual attendant, and from the 
impression of one to a more lively idea of the other’ (T: 170). Hence, this mental 
process of making idea brings the new idea, which we call ‘the idea of necessity’. 
When we see things, we derive a common feature and consequently we find the 
existence of the said connection. But we fail to see actually what is in real nature.  
For Hume actually there is no ‘part of nature’, which never ‘discover any power or 
energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce anything, or be followed 
by any other object, which we could denominate its effect’ (E: 63). Though some 
qualities like motion, solidity and extension are complete in themselves, they never 
point out ‘any other event, which may result from them’. We all know the universe is 
in continuous function and there are some functions in its order as one follows the 
other. Bu we cannot see any power, or any energy, which operates the succession.  
He argues that ‘we know, that, in fact, heat is a consistent attendant of flame; but 
what is the connection between them we have to room so much as to conjuncture or 
imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the 
contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no bodies 
ever discover any power which can be the original idea of this idea’ (E: 64). Hume’s 
such denial is not his ultimate conclusion of his idea. Mainly, scholars take up this 
claim as the final conclusion and interpret that Hume denied the idea of necessary 
connection. He denies the way by which we attempt to conclude. Instead, he 
intends to substitute the alternative method to prove this concept. 
As he assented, the only reliable mean is experience. He has proved that by 
experiencing the external objects, we cannot see any connection, or this habit of 
seeing external objects ‘give us no idea of power or necessary connection. Hence, 
he thinks to see an alternative that ‘whether this idea be derived from reflection on 
the operation of our own minds, and be copied from internal impression’ (E: 64). 




We, for clear understanding, have to see, how we get this internal impression and 
its correspondent idea and how our mind works.  This explanation is very important 
to understand Hume. According to Hume, ‘we are every moment conscious of 
internal power. We have a command of will and by that we direct our mind. Hence, 
“An act of volition produces motion in our limps, or raises a new idea in our 
imagination” (E: 64). We can understand this will, by our consciousness, we acquire 
the idea of power or energy and we posses this idea of power. Hence, “this idea, 
then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our 
own mind” (E: 4). This comes, according to Hume, by ‘our organs of the body and 
faculties of the soul’. This is Hume’s finding of inter-factions in the soul and the 
exposition its effects. 
Hume’s total argument with regard to power is this: it is true that we derive ideas of 
many things such as soul, causal power and the so forth.  For him, things like soul 
are production of something out of nothing. Some similar ideas also generated by 
the mind based on its will. Causal connection as well, is not generated by reasoning 
but by experience. We know that we can study well in the morning than in the 
evening. The sick man can work less than the man in good health and the like. We 
should understand how we comprehend such ideas and also we should know is 
there any fixed norm which make us to think as such. These are come to our mind 
only by experience. This is appropriate to the idea of power or causal connection. 
Our mind consists of mechanism to think in such way. The cause and effect and its 
‘connection’ is wholly depend on a “secret Mechanism” which is entirely unknown to 
us. These circumstances make us to think and comprehend the power by our sole 
empirical understanding. 
When we analyse how we get this experience and on what this function depends, 
we can get an answer, according to Hume, is volition. “Volition is surely an act of 
mind, which we are sufficiently acquired. As we understood this volition functions, 
not solely on reasoning, it also requires empirical base. From the experience, it is 
capable of creating new idea. We observe number of instances in the external 
world, and synthesise these instances. For these syntheses, the mind takes the 
common features that appear in objects. The mind, in its volition, creates the new 
idea from the features. Because of volition, mind produce the idea of necessary 
connection. According to him ‘frequent conjunction of objects which we perceive 
through our long experience, we are able to comprehend anything like connexion 
between them’ (E: 70). Any two objects seen constantly, we perceive these as 
impression of reflection from which we perceive idea of necessary connection 
3.   Conclusion: 
1. Pervious philosophers ascertained, including Cartesians, knowledge in inborn 
and ideas are innate. According to their philosophy necessary connection is one 
of the ideas, which inhere as logical tie. He refutes the idea that necessary 
connection is not a logical tie derived by intuition or demonstration. But he 
accepts that there is connection between cause and effect. 




2. If any idea is coming to exist there must be an impression of it. If there is no 
impression, there is no idea. Basically he did not say directly there is impression 
of necessary connection. He states that ‘the idea of necessity arises from some 
impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses, which can give rise 
to that idea. It must, therefore, be derived from some internal impression, or 
impression of reflection (T: 15). 
3. Hume affirms and accept that necessary connection does exist (E:77). In an 
action we seen this productive of one from other in the context of contiguity and 
succession. But it cannot be explained by intuition or demonstration.  
4. Necessary connection in the objects is a function of regular patterns of 
behaviour. This happens as the collectives of constant conjunction. We can’t 
conceive any causal necessity in the behaviour, but we believe. The regular 
patterns are not accidental, hence there is permanent tie. 
5. The repetition in action makes to think about a power, which produce something 
new. This power is possible due to customary transition, which produce the 
connection. This connection is possible and exists. 
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